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吴增定,北京大学美学与美育研究中心、北京大学哲学系(北京 100871)。
收稿日期:2024-10-20,
纸质出版日期:2025-05-15
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吴增定.“我思故我在”与本体论证明:谢林论笛卡尔 [J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2025,65(03):152-161.
Wu Zengding.“I think, therefore I am” and the Ontological Argument: Schelling on Descartes[J].Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition),2025,65(03):152-161.
吴增定.“我思故我在”与本体论证明:谢林论笛卡尔 [J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2025,65(03):152-161. DOI: 10.13471/j.cnki.jsysusse.2025.03.014.
Wu Zengding.“I think, therefore I am” and the Ontological Argument: Schelling on Descartes[J].Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition),2025,65(03):152-161. DOI: 10.13471/j.cnki.jsysusse.2025.03.014.
传统哲学史视“我思故我在”为笛卡尔哲学核心,而上帝存在的本体论证明仅被视为次要工具。谢林在《近代哲学史》中提出相反论断:本体论证明才是笛卡尔思想的基石,其将上帝定义为“必然存在者”,确立了存在与本质的同一性逻辑,奠定了现代理性主义形而上学的根基。谢林指出,笛卡尔的论证虽未证实上帝存在,却揭示了其作为“盲目必然性”的困境——上帝因必然性丧失自由,沦为僵化的逻辑客体。这一逻辑经斯宾诺莎、莱布尼茨发展,至黑格尔达至顶峰:黑格尔将“我思”与本体论证明融合,构建以辩证法为核心的封闭体系,将存在完全纳入概念的自我运动,形成“否定哲学”。谢林批判此路径遮蔽了存在的原初自由,主张通过“肯定哲学”重新追问超越概念、逻辑的“不可预思之在”——上帝作为先于必然性的自由主体。文章同时指出,谢林过度聚焦本体论证明,忽视笛卡尔因果性证明中上帝作为“无限意志”的超越性维度。列维纳斯与马里翁强调,笛卡尔的上帝实为溢出理性把握的“他者”,暗示其哲学中理性与存在的根本张力。谢林的解读既凸显现代哲学的本体论逻辑,也暴露其封闭性,为反思理性与自由的辩证关系提供了批判性视角。
Traditional history of philosophy regards “I think, therefore I am” as the core of Descartes’ philosophy, while the ontological argument of God’s existence is only regarded as a secondary tool. In
The History of Modern Philosophy
, Schelling puts forward the o
pposite assertion: ontological argument is the cornerstone of Descartes’ thought. He defines God as a “necessary being”, establishes the logic of the identity of existence and essence, and lays the foundation for modern rationalist metaphysics. Schelling points out that although Descartes’ argument does not prove the existence of God, it reveals its dilemma as “blind necessity” that God loses his freedom due to necessity and becomes a rigid logical object. This logic was developed by Spinoza and Leibniz and reached its peak in Hegel: Hegel integrated “I think” with ontological argument, constructed a closed system with dialectics as the core, and completely incorporated existence into the self-movement of concepts, forming a “negative philosophy”. Schelling criticized this path for obscuring the original freedom of existence, and advocated re-questioning the “unthinkable existence” beyond concepts and logic through “positive philosophy” that God as a free subject prior to necessity. The article also points out that Schelling over-focuses on the ontological argument and ignores the transcendental dimension of God as “infinite will” in Descartes’ causal argument of God’s existence. Levinas and Marion emphasize that Descartes’ God is actually the infinite “other” that overflows the human reason, implying the fundamental tension between reason and existence in his philosophy. Schelling’s interpretation not only highlights the ontological logic of modern philosophy, but also exposes its closed nature, providing a critical perspective for reflecting on the dialectical relationship between reason and freedom.
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