王禹诺,中共厦门市委党校(厦门 361027)
龙小宁,厦门大学知识产权研究院(厦门 361005)
时杨洁,厦门大学知识产权研究院(厦门 361005)。
收稿:2025-09-21,
纸质出版:2026-05-15
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王禹诺,龙小宁,时杨洁.专利侵权诉讼中停止侵害救济的当然适用分析 [J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2026,66(03):168-180.
Wang Yunuo,Long Xiaoning,Shi Yangjie.Analysis of the Automatic Application of Cessation of Infringement Remedies in Patent Litigation: An Empirical Study Based on Data from Chinese Listed Companies[J].Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition),2026,66(03):168-180.
王禹诺,龙小宁,时杨洁.专利侵权诉讼中停止侵害救济的当然适用分析 [J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2026,66(03):168-180. DOI: 10.11714/jsysu.sse.202603018.
Wang Yunuo,Long Xiaoning,Shi Yangjie.Analysis of the Automatic Application of Cessation of Infringement Remedies in Patent Litigation: An Empirical Study Based on Data from Chinese Listed Companies[J].Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition),2026,66(03):168-180. DOI: 10.11714/jsysu.sse.202603018.
依据《中华人民共和国民法典》《中华人民共和国专利法》有关规定,专利权受到侵害时适用停止侵害救济是原则,不适用是例外。但停止侵害救济的当然适用极易导致专利权人对侵权人的禁令威胁,使得专利权人获得与其权利不成比例的优势,而对于适用停止侵害责任对原、被告双方带来的具体损害,未有实证研究。本文聚焦于微观层面,使用事件研究法系统考察企业面临专利诉讼“停止侵害责任”当然适用时,中国资本市场中发生的股价变化。研究表明:第一,权利人/原告(申请停止侵害救济的一方)获得停止侵害救济时,企业市值会受到正面影响,反之会受到负面影响;第二,无论停止侵害救济适用与否,实施者/被告(被申请方)在被起诉时,企业市值均会受到负面影响,且在判决停止侵害后其市值又会遭受第二轮打击,不利判决带来的冲击幅度更大;第三,两相对比,即使当原告从判决中获益时,其数额也远不及被告所受损失。基于此,本文认为停止侵害救济对诉讼双方带来巨大总体负面影响,可能有损社会总福利。因此应适度扩张侵权不停止适用范围,将社会总体利益和原、被告双方利益衡量纳入考量,以缓解这一制度安排可能带来的社会总福利损失。
Pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China and the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, the application of the cessation of infringement remedies is the general rule when patent rights are infringed, and its non-application constitutes an exception. However, the automatic application of such remedies readily enables patent holders to threaten infringers with injunctions, granting them disproportionate advantages relative to their rights. Yet, no empirical research has examined the specific damages inflicted upon both plaintiffs and defendants by the remedies to cease infringement. Focusing on the micro level, this paper employs an event study method to systematically examine stock price movements in Chinese capital markets when enterprises face the automatic imposition of remedies to cease infringement in patent infringement litigation. Findings indicate: first, when the patent holder/plaintiff (the party applying for the cessation of infringement remedy) obtains such remedy, the enterprise’s market value experiences a positive impact, whereas it suffers a negative impact; second, regardless of whether the cessation of infringement remedies is ultimately applied, the implementer/defendant (the party against whom the application is filed) suffers a negative impact on firm value upon being sued, followed by a second round of negative shock after a remedy is granted. Among these two rounds of negative impacts, an unfavorable judgment corresponds to a greater magnitude of impact; third, comparative analysis shows that even when plaintiffs benefit from judgments, their gains are far outweighed by the losses incurred by defendants. Based on these findings, this paper argues that the application of the remedy to cease infringement imposes significant overall negative consequences on both parties to the litigation, thereby diminishing overall social welfare. The conditions for applying the remedy to cease infringement should be appropriately expanded to incorporate considerations of overall societal interests and the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants, thereby mitigating the overall welfare loss resulting from this institutional arrangement.
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