Physicalist account of the mind is widely embraced because of causal closure of the physical world. Physicalists， resorting to empirical researches from physics and neurophysiology， contend that any causal interactions in the physical world are causal interactions characterized by fundamental forces. That such a characterization of physical causation cannot draw a logical distinction between physicalism and Russellian panpsychism implies that the argument from causal closure of the physical does not decisively lend support to physicalism. This article aims to respond to such a challenge in light of empirical researches from neuroscience. Abundant neuroscientific evidences illustrate that the phenomenal structures of conscious experiences are isomorphic to the physical structures of corresponding neural correlates. In virtue of the fact that physicalism furnishes a better explanation for the phenomenon of psycho-neuro isomorphism than that provided by Russellian panpsychism， there is good reason to regard physicalism as a plausible metaphysics for the mind-body problem.