袁 青,厦门大学哲学系(厦门 361005)。
收稿:2025-09-20,
纸质出版:2026-03-15
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袁青.清华简《畏天用身》与早期中国的天人观 [J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2026,66(02):136-145.
Yuan Qing.Tsinghua Bamboo Slip Weitian Yongshen and the Early Chinese Conception of Heaven and Humanity[J].Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition),2026,66(02):136-145.
袁青.清华简《畏天用身》与早期中国的天人观 [J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2026,66(02):136-145. DOI: 10.11714/jsysu.sse.202602013.
Yuan Qing.Tsinghua Bamboo Slip Weitian Yongshen and the Early Chinese Conception of Heaven and Humanity[J].Journal of Sun Yat-sen University(Social Science Edition),2026,66(02):136-145. DOI: 10.11714/jsysu.sse.202602013.
清华简《畏天用身》作为战国中后期一篇无明确学派归属的思想文献,提出了一种以“运命之天”与“自主之身”为两极、以认知心为枢纽的新型天人关系模型。通过与《命训》《心是谓中》及儒、道思想的对比可见,《畏天用身》既不承袭前诸子时期“以天统人”的神道政治逻辑,亦不同于儒家将人为限定于道德修养的伦理化路径,更迥异于道家顺应天命的退守姿态。该篇在承认命运不可全控的前提下,高度肯定人的理性认知与实践能力,主张通过“强心志”“慎将作”等策略性行动实现“用身足矣”。尤为关键的是,《畏天用身》与同属清华简的《心是谓中》共同彰显一种“去伦理化”的认知主体性,其“心”指向理性谋划而非道德本体。此类文本代表了战国中后期一条被主流叙事遮蔽的实践理性型思想脉络,是士人阶层崛起与社会变革的精神产物。早期中国的“天人之分”可析为三类:一是以《命训》和早期道家为代表的“分中有合”型;二是以《畏天用身》《心是谓中》等为代表的“命运—人为”二分型;三是荀子所主张的“自然—人事”二分型。此三分框架有助于重绘早期中国天人思想的多元图景,深刻反映了士人在社会剧变中对“人的能力”的自觉探索。
As a philosophical text from the mid-to-late Warring States period without clear sectarian affiliation, the Tsinghua Bamboo Slip manuscript
Weitian Yongshen
畏天用身proposes a novel model of the Heaven-human relationship structured around two poles—“heaven as fate” and “the autonomous self”—with the cog
nitive mind serving as the pivotal link. Comparative analysis with texts such as the
Mingxun
命训,
Xin Shiwei Zhong
心是谓中and Confucian and Daoist doctrines reveals that
Weitian Yongshen
neither inherits the pre-philosophical paradigm of “subordinating humanity to heaven” characteristic of early theocratic politics, nor follows the Confucian ethical path that confines human agency primarily to moral cultivation or the Daoist stance of passive acquiescence to Heaven’s mandate. Instead, while acknowledging that fate cannot be fully controlled,
Weitian Yongshen
strongly affirms human rational cognition and practical capacity, advocating strategic actions—such as “strengthening the will of the heart” and “acting with utmost caution” —to achieve the ideal state encapsulated in the phrase “employing the self is sufficient”. Crucially, together with another Tsinghua manuscript,
Xin Shiwei Zhong
, it articulates a form of “de-ethicalized” cognitive subjectivity: here, the “heart/mind” (xin心) functions as an instrument of rational deliberation rather than as a moral essence. Such texts represent a strand of practical-rational thought in the mid-to-late Warring States period—one obscured by later dominant narratives—and reflect the intellectual ferment accompanying the rise of the scholar-official class and profound socio-political transformations. Early Chinese conceptions of the distinction between Heaven and humanity can be classified into three types: the “distinction-within-unity” model, exemplified by the
Mingxun
and early Daoism; the “fate-human agency” dualism, represented by
Weitian Yongshen
and
Xin Shiwei Zhong
; and the “natural order-human affairs” dichotomy articulated by Xunzi荀子. This tripartite framework offers a more nuanced map of early Chinese Heaven-human discourses and vividly captures how intellectuals, amid social upheaval, consciously explored the scope and limits of human c
apability.
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